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APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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PETITION FOR REVIEW

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Gregory Allynn Gentry asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of the
Idaho Court of Appeals, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 531 (Ct. App. May 30, 2014)

(hereinafter, Opinion). He submits that this Court should exercise its review authority in
this case because the Opinion decided a question of substance not yet decided by the
Idaho Supreme Court; namely, the scope of Idaho Criminal Rule 33(e) and whether
Rule 33(e) is in conflict with the statutes governing probation revocatio
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
While he was incarcerated

the Bannock County Jail, Mr. Gentry struck one of

the jail deputies. (Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.) Mr. Gentry was charged
with one count of battery on detention staff, felony, in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-903
and 18-915(2)(b). (R., pp.1-2.) He initially entered a plea of not guilty to the charge.
(R., pp.51-52.) Mr. Gentry subsequently entered into a binding Idaho Criminal Rule 11

plea agreement with the State. (R., pp.87-89, Tr., p.1, Ls.11-15.) Pursuant to the plea
agreement, the State agreed to dismiss the pending charges in two other cases,
Bannock County Nos. CR 2011-2951 and CR 2011-1
In exchange, Mr.
in the present

to
2

and to

.1

(Tr., p.7, L.22 - p.9, L.7.)

guilty to the battery on detention staff charge
violating his probation in Bannock County No.

CR 2009-11390 (hereinafter, the injury to jail case), a case where he had been charged
with felony injury to jail and placed on probation to the mental health court. 3 (PSI, p.7;
Tr., p.9, Ls.3-12, p.33, Ls.10-11.) The district court accepted Mr. Gentry's guilty plea.
(R., pp.84-85.)
At the sentencing hearing, the district court signed the binding Rule 11
agreement. (Tr., p.24, Ls.21-22.) Pursuant to the binding Rule 11 agreement, the State

1

In No. CR 2011-2951, Mr. Gentry was charged with possession of a controlled
substance, methamphetamine. (R., p.88). In No. CR 2011-15058, Mr. Gentry was
charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver,
methamphetamine. (R., p.88.)
2 At the change of plea hearing, Mr. Gentry indicated that while he did not have an
independent recollection of the incident, he decided to change his plea after reviewing a
video recording of the incident. (Tr., p.7, Ls.8-21.)
3 At the change of plea hearing, the district court found that Mr. Gentry had admitted to
violating the terms and conditions of his probation in the injury to jail case, because he
had violated the rules of mental health court and incurred the new battery on detention
staff charge. (Tr., p.17, L.25 - p.18, L.5.) The district court also terminated Mr. Gentry
from mental health court. (Tr., p.19, Ls.16-21.)
2

and Mr.

recommended placing Mr. Gentry on a period of probation. (R., p.88,
Ls.16-19, p.34, Ls.3-19.) Mr. Gentry intended to

Tr.,

an

compact

to Minnesota and live with his mother in that state. (PSI, p.10, Tr., p.25, Ls.1

1.) The

State also recommended imposing an underlying unified sentence of five years, with
three years fixed, to run consecutively with the sentence imposed in the injury to jail
case. (Tr., p.34, Ls.3-14.)
The district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed,
to run consecutively with the sentence in the injury to jail case. 4 (R., pp.90-97.) The
district court suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Gentry on probation for a period
of three years, to run consecutively with the probation in No.

1390. 5

, p.91.)
Later, Mr. Gentry's probation officer alleged in a report of probation violation that
Mr. Gentry had violated the terms and conditions of his probation.
Mr. Gentry initially denied the alleged violations.

(R., pp.112-13.)

(R., pp.101-03.)

He subsequently

admitted to violating his probation by associating with a known felon, failing to provide a
requested urine sample, changing his residence without permission, and failing to report
to his probation officer. (R., pp.120-21, Tr., p.48, L.17- p.49, L.23; see R., pp.101-02.)
The district court found that Mr. Gentry was in violation of the terms and conditions of
his probation. (R., pp.121-22, Tr., p.50, Ls.13-15.)

In the injury to jail case, the sentence was a unified sentence of five years, with three
¥ears fixed, and with credit for time served. (Tr., p.39, Ls.2-6.)
In the injury to jail case, the district court suspended the sentence and placed
Mr. Gentry on probation for a period of three years. (Tr., p.39, Ls.6-8.) Thus,
Mr. Gentry would be on probation for a total period of six years. (Tr., p.39, L.16.)

4

3

At the admit/deny hearing, Mr. Gentry acknowledged that Minnesota was no
an option for an interstate compact, but he advised the district court that he
would seek an interstate compact to North Carolina to stay with his maternal aunt there.
(Tr., p.50, L.16

p.51, L.12.) The district court continued Mr. Gentry on probation for a

period of three years, to run consecutively with the probation in the injury to jail
and with the following additional terms and conditions:
1. You will apply through the Interstate Compact to transfer to North
Carolina to live with your maternal Aunt. The Court will waive the
application fee for the Interstate Compact.
2. Should you fail to be approved for the Interstate Compact to North
Carolina, you will need to come back before the Court.
You will remain incarcerated at
Bannock County Jail until the Court
sends a separate order to release you.
(R., p.1

.)

About a month later, Mr. Gentry's probation officer filed an order to show cause
alleging that Mr. Gentry had violated the first additional term and condition of his
probation. (R., pp.125-26.) The probation officer stated that the additional term and
condition had been violated because he had "received an email from the defendant's
maternal aunt saying that the defendant cannot live with her in North Carolina."
(R., p.125.) "She indicated she was not in a position to provide support for him and
indicated [that she] and her husband have six children in the home and they plan on
purchasing a firearm in the future."

(R., p.125.)

The probation officer referred the

matter back to the district court for further disposition. (R., p.125.)
At the order to show cause hearing, held on January 7, 2013, Mr. Gentry's
counsel acknowledged that Mr. Gentry would not be able to live with his maternal aunt

4

in North Carolina.

(Tr., p.54, Ls.6-16.) Mr.

counsel recommended that

court place Mr. Gentry on probation in the Pocatello

considering his

inability to secure an interstate compact and access to the housing and social services
available to him through his local church.

(Tr., p.54, L.17

court set the matter for a later dispositional hearing.

p.55, L. ·J 9.) The district

(Tr., p.56, L.11

p.57, L.16.)

Mr. Gentry also requested that he be allowed a work release to search for work, but the
district court denied the request pending further information. (Tr., p.58, Ls.8-18, p.60,
Ls.5-17.) Mr. Gentry then filed a motion for work release, followed by an addendum.
(R., pp.130-40.)
At the dispositional hearing held on January

2013, Mr. Gentry requested that

the district court place him back on probation and afford him the opportunity for work
search and/or work release. (Tr., p.65, Ls.6-25, p.68, Ls.1-9.) Mr. Gentry's counsel told
the district court, "I believe that the Court revoking probation because Mr. Gentry fails to
execute and succeed on an interstate compact is unfair, your Honor." (Tr., p.75, Ls.25.) While Mr. Gentry indicated that Pocatello was not high on his list of places he would
prefer to live, he told the district court, "If I can make it in North Carolina, I'd like to be
given the opportunity to make it here." (Tr., p.81, Ls.8-11, p.83, Ls.4-6.)
However, the district court revoked probation in the present case and the injury to
jail case. (R., pp.141-47, Tr., p.86, Ls.14-15.) The district court found that Mr. Gentry
had violated the terms and conditions of his probation in this case "inasmuch as he has
failed to obtain Interstate Compact to North Carolina or any other State at this time."
(R., p.143.) The district court told Mr. Gentry, "I don't think you're ready to even follow
your plan yet, but I don't think you're ready to go to prison either." (Tr., p.86, Ls.11-13.)

5

The district court executed the underlying unified sentence of five years, with three
years fixed. (R., p.143.) The district court then retained jurisdiction and recommended
that Mr. Gentry be placed on a traditional "rider" program.

(R., pp.143-46, Tr., p.86,

Ls.15-17.)
Mr. Gentry participated in the CRP track of programming at the Correctional
Alternative Placement Program, but did not complete his programming. (Addendum to
the Presentence Investigation Report, pp.3, 5-6.) The district court then relinquished
jurisdiction. 6 (Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction, June 18, 2013.)
Meanwhile, Mr. Gentry filed a timely Notice of Appeal.

(R., pp.152-54.) The

Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order revoking probation and
executing the underlying sentence.

(Opinion, pp.1, 8.)

The Court of Appeals

determined that it did not need to address the question of whether Idaho Criminal Rule
33(e) conflicts with the statutes governing probation revocation. (Opinion, pp.5-6.) The
Court of Appeals stated that when the district court placed Mr. Gentry back on
probation, it imposed a "fundamental condition of probation" that "required that Gentry
receive an interstate compact transfer to North Carolina."

(Opinion, p.6.)

"When

Gentry's counsel appeared before the district court ... after an order to show cause
was filed, Gentry's counsel plainly acknowledged that the interstate compact transfer
would not succeed," and thus "Gentry had conceded that a fundamental condition of his
probation could not be completed." (Opinion, p.6.) The Court of Appeals then quoted

State v. Oyler, 92 Idaho 43, 47 (1968), for the proposition that, "After sound ·
determination that a probationer could not possibly perform a fundamental condition of

The sentence executed here and the sentence executed in the injury to jail case would
run consecutively. (See Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction, June 18, 2013.)

6

6

his

the judge has

to remove probation and pronounce

"

(internal quotation marks omitted).)
According to the Court of Appeals, the district court found that the option of
placing Mr. Gentry on probation for work release or work search in Pocatello would
inadequate to serve the State's legitimate interest in punishment, deterrence, and the
protection of society, because Mr. Gentry had already violated probation and informed
the district court that he did not want to remain in Pocatello. (Opinion, pp.6-7.) The
option would also be inadequate for Mr. Gentry to succeed. (Opinion, p.7.) Thus, the
Court of Appeals determined that, "Because the district court considered the work
or work search option submitted by Gentry and found that the option was
inadequate, and had on previous occasions attempted other alternatives sought
Gentry, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked
Gentry's probation."

(Opinion, p.7.) The Court of Appeals also held that the district

court did not abuse its discretion when it executed Mr. Gentry's suspended sentence
without any reduction. 7 (Opinion, pp.7-8.)
Mr. Gentry then filed

a Petition for Review timely from the Court of

Appeals' Opinion.

Mr. Gentry does not seek review of the Court of Appeals' holding that the district court
did not abuse its discretion when it executed his suspended sentence without
any reduction.
7

7

ISSUE
the Idaho Court of
Opinion affirming the district court's order revoking
Mr. Gentry's probation and executing his suspended sentence decide a question of
substance not yet decided by the Idaho Supreme Court, such that the Idaho Supreme
Court should grant review?

8

ARGUMENT
The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Opinion Affirming The District Court's Order Revoking
Mr. Gentry's Probation And Executing His Suspended Sentence Decides A Question Of
Substance Not Yet Decided By The Idaho Supreme Court And, Therefore, Review
Should Be Granted
A.

Introduction
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that the decision of whether to grant a petition

for review is discretionary on the part of the Idaho Supreme Court, and that petitions for
review may be granted only "when there are special and important reasons" for doing
so.

I.A.R. 118(b). This exercise of discretion is not completely unfettered. Rule 118(b)

provides a non-exhaustive list of five factors which must be

in evaluating

petition for review:
(1)

Whether the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance
not yet decided by the Idaho Supreme Court;

(2)

Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with
precedent from the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States
Supreme Court;

(3)

Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own
prior decisions;

(4)

Whether the Court of Appeals' actions are so unusual as to call for
the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority; and,

(5)

Whether a majority of the Court of Appeals has certified that further
appellate review is desirable.

I.A.R. 118(b). In this case, Mr. Gentry contends that there are special and important
reasons for review to be granted.

Specifically, the Opinion decides a question of

substance not yet decided by the Idaho Supreme Court. See I.A.R. 11 B(b )( 1).
The Court of Appeals determined that the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it revoked Mr. Gentry's probation, because Mr. Gentry could not

9

complete a fundamental condition of probation and placing him on probation for
would be inadequate. (Opinion, pp.6-7.) Thus, the Court of
decided that Idaho Criminal Rule 33(e) does not apply where a probationer could not
complete a "fundamental condition of probation." (See Opinion, pp.6-7.) The scope of
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(e) is a question of substance not yet decided by the Idaho
Su pre me Court. See I.A. R. 118(b )( 1).

B.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
Appellate courts use a two-step analysis in reviewing a probation revocation

proceeding. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). First, the appellate court
determines "whether the defendant violated

terms of his probation."

Id.

"If it is

determined that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his probation, the second
question is what should be the consequences of that violation." Id. "A district court's
decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing that the
court abused its discretion." Id.

In reviewing a district court's discretionary decision,

appellate courts conduct an inquiry "to determine whether the court correctly perceived
the issue as one of discretion, acted within the boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with the applicable legal standards, and reached its standards by an
exercise of reason. Id.

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Gentry's
Probation, Because Idaho Criminal Rule 33(e) Did Not Permit The District Court
To Revoke His Probation For A Non-Willful Violation
Mr. Gentry asserts that the district court did not act consistently with the

applicable legal standards when it revoked his probation.

10

The district court revoked

Gentry's probation after concluding that he
probation inasmuch as he has failed to obtain I

the terms and conditions of
Compact to North Carolina or

any other State at this time." (R., p.143.) Thus, Mr. Gentry's violation-his inability to
secure an interstate compact to North Carolina-was the sole basis for the district
court's revocation of probation. (R., p.143.) However, the law did not permit the district
court to revoke probation for that violation.

Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 33(e), a

district court may revoke probation only for a willful violation of a condition of probation.
Mr. Gentry's violation was not willful, because whether his aunt would be capable of
accommodating him in North Carolina was beyond his control. Thus, the district court
did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards when it revoked
Gentry's probation.
Rule 33(e) currently provides:
The court shall not revoke probation except after hearing at which the
defendant shall be present and apprised of the grounds on which such
action is proposed. The defendant may be admitted to bail pending such
hearing.
The court shall not revoke probation unless there is an
admission by the defendant or a finding by the court, following a hearing,
that the defendant willfully violated a condition of probation.
I.C.R. 33(e) (emphasis added).
A recent amendment added the last sentence of Rule 33(e).

Order In Re:

Amendments of Idaho Criminal Rules (I.C.R.) 6.6, 16, 25(a), 33, 41 (a) and 54.1 (Feb. 9,
2012), p.3. The amendment to Rule 33(e) was effective on July 1, 2012. Id. at p.5.
Because the hearings concerning the probation violation at issue here took place in
January 2013 (Tr., p.54, Ls.1-5, p.62, Ls.1-5), the current version of Rule 33(e) was
effective when the district court revoked Mr. Gentry's probation.

11

When the district court revoked Mr. Gentry's probation, Rule 33(e) permitted the
probation only for a willful violation of a condition of

court

8

Because the current version of Rule 33(e) uses the language "shall not," the restriction it
imposes is mandatory.

See, e.g., Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760 (2002) (quoting

Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841,848 (1995)). Thus, if a violation of a condition of probation
is not willful, a district court may not revoke probation. See I.C.R. 33(e).
Mr. Gentry submits that a probationer does not willfully violate a condition of
probation where the probationer had no control over the violation.
appellate cou

have not

law from

the

interpreted the current version of Rule 33(e), Idaho case
date of the amendment helps illustrate what

probation violation non-willful or willful. 9
violation is non-willful

While Idaho's

a

Idaho case law indicates that a probation

the probationer had no control over the violation. See, e.g.,

Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 441 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding, in an appeal from a
summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, that a neuropsychological evaluation

Mr. Gentry concedes that after the district court asked Mr. Gentry's counsel whether
he was telling the district court that it could not revoke probation, or instead that it
should not revoke probation, Mr. Gentry's counsel stated: "The Court should not revoke
probation at this point in time. I'm certainly not saying the Court cannot revoke
~robation." (Tr., p.79, Ls.9-16.)
Before Rule 33(e) was amended to the current version, "[t]he applicable legal standard
the district court must utilize in determining whether to revoke probation [was] based
upon whether the violation was willful or non-willful." Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 106.
8

If a knowing and intentional probation violation has been proved, a district
court's decision to revoke probation will be reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. However, if a probationer's violation of a probation condition
was not willful, or was beyond the probationer's control, a court may not
revoke probation and order imprisonment without first considering
alternative methods to address the violation.

Id. (quoting State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001 )).
12

likely played a substantial role in his probation violations); State v. Lafferty, 1

Idaho

378, 380, 382 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the record was insufficient to show that a
probationer willfully violated his probation, where the probationer, who was certified as
one-hundred percent disabled, was involuntarily terminated from a halfway house
program because he was unable to perform the carpentry work required as part of
the program).
Conversely, Idaho's appellate courts have held that a probation violation is willful
where the probationer is responsible or at fault for the violation. 10

e.g., State v.

Fife, 114 Idaho 103, 104-06 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the record supported the
district court's finding of a willful probation violation, where firearms were found at a
probationer's home after the probationer was informed he could not possess firearms
and he indicated that he understood that condition).
Here, Mr. Gentry's probation violation was not willful, because whether his aunt
would be capable of accommodating him in North Carolina was beyond his control. As
Mr. Gentry's counsel explained to the district court, Mr. Gentry's maternal aunt "has
children in the home and potentially firearms and would have difficulty complying with
This understanding of "willfully" in the context of I.C.R. 33(e) accords with definitions
of the term in other contexts. For example, Idaho's Criminal Code states that, generally
for purposes of that section, "The word 'willfully,' when applied to the intent with which
an act is done or omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or
make the omission referred to." I.C. § 18-101 (1 ). The Idaho Supreme Court has held
that the Criminal Code definition of "wilfullness" also applies to the Idaho Securities Act.
State v. Montgomery, 135 Idaho 348, 350, 352 (2001 ). Further, in the context of
contempt of court proceedings, the definition of "willful" is "an indifferent disregard of
duty" or "a remissness and failure in performance of a duty." In re Weick, 142 Idaho
275, 281 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
10

13

the terms and conditions of his probation and, furthermore, being of financial assistance
to

Gentry." (Tr.,

Ls.1

) According to Mr. Gentry's probation officer, the

aunt "is no[t] in a position to have [Mr. Gentry] live with her." (R., p.125.) Mr. Gentry
had no control over whether his aunt in North Carolina would have children or firearms
or both in her residence, because he was incarcerated at the Bannock County Jail at
the time and had no responsibility for his aunt's household situation. (See R., p.125.)
Thus, the violation of the terms and conditions of probation at issue here-his inability to
secure an interstate compact to North Carolina-was not willful.

By revoking Mr. Gentry's probation for the inability to secure an interstate
compact to North Carolina, the district court revoked his probation for a non-willful
violation. But Rule 33(e) permitted the district court to revoke probation only for a willful
violation of a condition of probation. Thus, the district court did not act consistently with
the applicable legal standards when it revoked probation. Because the district court did
not act consistently with the applicable legal standards, it abused its discretion when it
revoked Mr. Gentry's probation.

D.

The Idaho Court Of Appeals Decided A Question Of Substance Not Yet Decided
By The Idaho Supreme Court By Essentially Deciding That Idaho Criminal Rule
33(e) Does Not Apply Where A Probationer Could Not Complete A "Fundamental
Condition Of Probation"
As explained above, Mr. Gentry's probation violation at issue here was a non-

willful violation, and the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation
because it did not act consistently with Idaho Criminal Rule 33(e). However, the Court
of Appeals, when it determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
revoked Mr. Gentry's probation violation, essentially decided that Rule 33(e) does not

14

apply

a probationer could not complete a "fundamental condition of probation."

(See Opinion, pp.6-7.) The

of Rule

is a question of substance not yet

decided by the Idaho Supreme Court. See 1.A.R. 118(b)(1).
The Court of Appeals stated that Mr. Gentry conceded that a fundamental
condition of his probation could not be completed, and that, "After sound determination
that a probationer could not possibly perform a fundamental condition of his probation,
the judge has discretion to remove probation and pronounce sentence." (Opinion, p.6
(quoting State v. Oyler, 92 Idaho 43, 47 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted).)
The Court then determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
revoked Mr. Gentry's probation. (Opinion, pp.7-8.) Thus, the

rt essentially decided

that Rule 33(e), which contains plain language that does not permit a district court to
revoke probation for a non-willful violation such as Mr. Gentry's non-willful violation,
does not apply where a probationer could not complete a "fundamental condition of
probation." (See Opinion, pp.6-7.)
However, Oyler predates the adoption of the current version of Rule 33(e). Rule
33(e) does not distinguish between "fundamental" and "non-fundamental" conditions of
probation, but instead provides that: "The court shall not revoke probation unless there
is an admission by the defendant or a finding by the court, following a hearing, that the
defendant willfully violated a condition of probation."

I.C.R. 33(e) (emphasis added).

Thus, the key consideration for deciding whether a district court may revoke probation is
not whether the condition violated was fundamental or non-fundamental, but whether
the violation itself was willful or non-willful.

See I.C.R. 33(e).

district court may not revoke probation for a non-willful violation.

15

Under Rule 33(e), a

The Court of Appeals here essentially decided that Idaho Criminal Rule 33(e)
not apply where a probationer could not

a "fundamental condition of

probation." (See Opinion, pp.6-7.) The scope of Rule 33(e) is a question of substance
not yet decided by the Idaho Supreme Court. See I.A.R. 118(b)(1 ). Thus, this Court
should exercise its review authority in this case.

E.

Idaho Criminal Rule 33(e) Is Not In Conflict VVith The Statutes Governing
Probation Revocation
Whether Idaho Criminal Rule 33(e) is in conflict with the statutes governing

probation revocation is a question of first impression before this Court. The Idaho Court
Appeals determined that it did not

to address the question

whether Idaho

Criminal Rule 33(e) conflicts with the statutes governing probation revocation. (Opinion,
pp.5-6.) Mr. Gentry asserts that Rule 33(e) is not in conflict with the statutes governing
probation revocation.
Before the Court of Appeals, the State argued that "[t]he district court had
authority under a number of relevant statutes to revoke Gentry's probation upon finding
him in violation thereof, regardless of whether the violation was willful. To the extent
Rule 33(e) conflicts with the statutes that govern a court's authority to revoke probation,
the statutes-not the procedural rule-prevail." (Resp. Br., p.8.) However, Rule 33(e)
and the statutes governing probation revocation are not in conflict, and should be so
interpreted.

Rule 33(e) and the statutes do not authorize a district court to revoke

probation for a non-willful violation.
'The interpretation of statutes and judicial rules is ... a matter of free review."
State v. Herrera, 149 Idaho 216, 222 (Ct. App. 2009). "When a statute and rule can be

16

reasonably interpreted so that there is no conflict between them, they should be so
interpreted rather than interpreted in a way that results in a conflict" State v. Johnson,

145 Idaho 970, 974 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The statutes cited by the State as governing "[t]he authority of a trial court to
revoke probation" are I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 and 20-222.

(Resp. Br., pp.9-10.)

Section 19-2602 provides that:
If it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the terms and conditions
upon which the defendant was placed on probation by the court or any of
them have been violated or for any other cause satisfactory to the court,
the court may, at any time within the longest period for which the
defendant might have been originally sentenced by judgment of the court,
issue a bench warrant for the rearrest of the defendant.
The following statute, Section 19-2603, states that:
When the defendant is brought before the court in such case, it may, if
judgment has been withheld, pronounce any judgment which it could
originally have pronounced, or, if judgment was originally pronounced but
suspended, the original judgment shall be in full force and effect and may
be executed according to law, and the time such person shall have been
at large under such suspended sentence shall not be counted as a part of
the term of his sentence, but the time of the defendant's sentence shall
count from the date of service of such bench warrant.
The relevant portion of Section 20-222 provides that:

At any time during probation or suspension of sentence, the court may
issue a warrant for violating any of the conditions of probation or
suspension of sentence and cause the defendant to be arrested.
Thereupon the court, after summary hearing may revoke the probation
and suspension of sentence and cause the sentence imposed to be
executed, or may cause the defendant to be brought before it and may
continue or revoke the probation, or may impose any sentence which
originally might have been imposed at the time of conviction.
The State argued that "it simply is not possible to reasonably interpret I.C.R. 33(e) in a
way that does not conflict with I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 and 20-222." (Resp. Br., p.12.)

17

Appeals, Rule 33( e) and the statutes governing probation revocation can

reasonably

interpreted so that there is no conflict between them, and should be so interpreted.
Thus, Rule 33(e) and the statutes do not authorize a district court to revoke probation
for a non-willful violation.
The Idaho Supreme Court's decision in State v. Pedraza, 101 Idaho 440 (1980),
illustrates why Rule 33(e) and the statutes governing probation revocation are not in
conflict. In Pedraza, the issue before the Court was "whether a trial court may increase
a previously imposed but suspended sentence upon a finding that

violated the conditions of his probation." Pedraza, 101 Idaho

defendant

441. The case hinged

on the interpretation of I.C. §§ 19-2603 and 20-222, two of the probation revocation
statutes now cited by the State in support of its argument in this case. See id. The
Court observed that, "Both statutes discuss the sentencing court's alternatives should it
determine that the defendant has violated the conditions of his probation." Id.
Turning to the language of the statutes, the Pedraza Court stated that I.C. § 192603, "when applied to this case, would appear to restrict the sentencing court to the
sentence originally imposed."

Id.

However, the State argued that the language of

I.C. § 20-222 "empowers a sentencing court to increase the sentence originally imposed
but suspended, upon a finding of violation of probation." Id. at 442. The Court rejected
the State's argument: "We think that fundamental rules of statutory construction and the
statutory sentencing scheme itself require a contrary conclusion." Id.
According to the Pedraza Court, "It is clear that, if reasonably possible, we must
reconcile the apparent inconsistency between I.C. §§ 19-2603 and 20-222."
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Id.

in

(pertaining to the same subject), although in apparent conflict,

so far as reasonably possible construed to be in harmony with

other."

Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted).
Pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601, when a criminal defendant is found guilty of the crime
charged, the district court may, among its sentencing alternatives, choose to suspend
the execution of judgment, or withhold judgment. Id. The Pedraza Court explained that,
"In either case, the defendant is placed on probation." The Court further decided that
I.C. § 20-222 "repeatedly refers to 'probation or suspension of sentence' and therefore
must apply to probation which follows the suspension of execution of judgment as well
as probation following a withheld judgment." Id. (quoting I.C. § 20-222).
The

Court was "convinced that the portion of [I.C. §

~~

~~,-- which

permits a court to 'impose any sentence which originally might have been imposed at
the time of conviction' refers only to a revocation of probation following a withheld
judgment."

Id. (quoting I.C. § 20-222). In contrast, "the portion which permits the

original 'sentence imposed to be executed' refers to a revocation of probation following
a suspension of the execution of judgment and sentence." Id. (quoting I.C. § 20-222).
"Construing this language any other way would lead to an irreconcilable conflict
between I.C. §§ 19-2603 and 20-222. Such a conflict would lead to the implicit repeal of
I.C. § 19-2603, since it was enacted prior to I.C. § 20-222.

[R]epeal of statutes by

implication is not favored." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the
Court concluded "that when a trial court has initially sentenced a criminal defendant to a
definite term of imprisonment, but has suspended the sentence and granted probation,
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of probation

it

term

that

and increase the

imprisonment." Id.
Following the Idaho Supreme Court's reasoning in Pedraza, Rule 33(e) and the

statutes governing probation revocation can be reasonably interpreted so that there is
no conflict between them. Rule 33(e) and the statutes both pertain to the same subject:
both discuss the district court's alternatives should it determine that a defendant has
violated the conditions of his probation. See Pedraza, 101 Idaho at 441; I.C.R. 33(e).
Just as two statutes, if reasonably possible, should be construed to be in harmony with
each other, id. at 442, if a

and a rule can

reasonably interpreted so that there

is no conflict between them, they should be so interpreted. Johnson, 1

Idaho at 974.

The Pedraza Court, reasonably construing I.C. §§ 19-2603 and 20-222, decided
that the portion of Section 20-222 "which permits a court to 'impose any sentence which
originally might have been imposed at the time of conviction' refers only to a revocation
of probation following a withheld judgment."

Pedraza, 101 Idaho at 442 (quoting

I.C. § 20-222). The portion of Section 20-222 "which permits the original 'sentence to
be executed' refers to a revocation of probation following a suspension of the execution
of judgment and sentence." Id. (quoting I.C. § 20-222). This was because Section 192603 indicated that '"if judgment was originally pronounced but suspended, the original
judgment shall be in full force and effect and may be executed according to law."' See
id. at 441 (quoting I.C. § 19-2603). Thus, Section 19-2603 "restrict(ed] the sentencing

court to the sentence originally imposed" in a probation revocation where the district
court, instead of previously withholding judgment, previously imposed a definite
sentence and suspended that sentence. See id. at 441-42.
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construing Rule 33(e)
revocation in

of - ,"'r""

the statutes governing probation
that the district court

0

was restricted

from revoking probation for Mr. Gentry's non-willful violation. See Pedraza, 101 Idaho
at 441-42. The portion of I.C. § 19-2603 which permits a court to "execute[] [the original
judgment] according to law," as well as the portions of Section 20-222 which permit a
court to "revoke the probation and suspension of sentence and cause the sentence
imposed to be executed," or "cause the defendant to be brought before it and ...
revoke the probation," refer only to a probation disposition following an admission or
finding of a willful probation violation.
provides that, 'The court shall not

id. at 442.

This is because Rule 33(e)

probation unless there is an admission by the

defendant or a finding by the court, following a hearing, that defendant willfully violated
a condition of probation." Under this reasonable interpretation of the rule and statutes,
the portion of Section 20-222 which permits a court to "cause the defendant to be
brought before it and continue . . . the probation" refers to a probation disposition
following an admission or finding of a willful probation violation, as well as to a probation
disposition following an admission or finding of a non-willful violation. See Pedraza, 101
Idaho at 442. While Rule 33(e) restricts when a district court may revoke probation, it is
silent on when a district court may continue probation. See I.C.R. 33(e).
Thus, contrary to the State's argument before the Court of Appeals, Rule 33(e)
and the statutes governing probation violation can be reasonably interpreted so that
there is no conflict between them. See Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974; Pedraza, 101 Idaho
at 441-42. And because they can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no conflict
between them, "they should be so interpreted rather than interpreted in a way that
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results in a conflict." See Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because Rule 33(e) and the statutes are not in conflict, there is no need for this Court to
determine whether any potential conflict would be one of procedure or one of
substance. See id.

Rule 33(e) and the statutes governing probation violation do not

authorize a district court to revoke probation for a non-willful violation.
The State also argued before the Court of Appeals that, "Nowhere in [I.C. § 20222] is there a requirement that the violation be 'willful.' Rather, the only limitation on
the court's authority to revoke probation imposed by this statute is that there actually be
a violation of one or more conditions of probation." (Resp. Br., pp.9-10.) This argument
by the State is unavailing. As discussed above, the Pedraza Court decided that the
portion of Section 20-222 "which permits a court to 'impose any sentence which
originally might have been imposed at the time of conviction' refers only to a revocation
of probation following a withheld judgment."

Pedraza, 101 Idaho at 442 (quoting

I.C. § 20-222). The Court reached that conclusion despite the fact that nowhere in the
version of Section 20-222 interpreted by the Court (which was substantially identical to
the current version) was there a requirement that there must have been a withheld
judgment for that portion of the statute to apply. See id.; I.C. § 20-222 (2013). Thus, a
sentencing scheme composed of statutes-or statutes and rules-may, when the
statutes and rules are reasonably interpreted together, contain restrictions on district
courts that do not appear on the face of one of the statutes or rules. See Pedraza, 101
Idaho at 442. The State's argument contradicts this proposition and the Idaho Supreme
Court's decision in Pedraza.
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In sum, the Court of Appeals here essentially decided that Idaho Criminal Rule
33(e)

not apply where a probationer could not complete a "fundamental condition

of probation."

(See Opinion, pp.6-7.)

The scope of Rule 33(e) is a question of

substance not yet decided by the Idaho Supreme Court. See I.AR. 11 S(b )(1 ). Thus,
this Court should exercise its review authority in this case. Additionally, whether Rule
33( e) is in conflict with the statutes governing probation revocation is a question of first
impression before this Court.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Gentry respectfully requests
review. On review, Mr. Gentry respectfully

that this Court

Court grant
his case to

the district court for the entry of an order placing him back on probation.
DATED this 30 th day of June, 2014.

BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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